

A World Security Community of Democratic Nations

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Abstract

Possible routes to a global parliament are discussed. Reform of the United Nations has always been stymied by the difficulty in amending the UN Charter. We argue that a more likely route is that of 'uniting the democracies', beginning with a community of democracies on the European model. A detailed example is outlined, involving a world security community of democratic nations.

We have formed a Coalition for a World Community of Democratic Nations to promote these ideas. The coalition would benefit enormously from any participation by the GCF.

Recommendation 1. *We recommend that the GCF should join, and support, the Coalition for a World Community of Democratic Nations.*

We would like to organise a high-level international conference, or series of conferences, to discuss ideas of this sort.

Recommendation 2. *We recommend that the GCF should support a high-level international conference on the idea of a world community of democratic nations.*

1. Introduction

The Global Challenges Foundation has outlined the need for some form of global parliament. Global problems require global solutions. Issues such as world peace, climate change and preservation of the global environment, or the fight against poverty, disease and starvation in the Third World, can only be resolved by all nations acting together. Such issues demand a better system of global governance than we presently have, and ideally a global parliament.

The more difficult question is, *how do we get there from here?* World federalists have been grappling with this problem ever since World War II. Uniting seven billion people in two hundred countries – each jealous of its sovereignty – is an enormous task. Like climbing Mount Everest, it will not be achieved in a single giant bound. We will only get there gradually, through a series of base camps.

The realist Hans Morgenthau, for instance, wrote [1] in 1948 that: "The argument of the advocates of the world state is unanswerable. There can be no permanent international peace without a state coextensive with the confines of the political world." He argues, however, that such a world state is simply not feasible: "No

society exists coextensive with the presumed range of a world state. The nation is the recipient of man's highest secular loyalties. Beyond it there are other nations, but no community for which man would be willing to act regardless of what he understands the interests of his own nation to be. In other words, the people of the world are not ready to accept world government, and their overriding loyalty to their own nation erects an insurmountable obstacle to its establishment." Times have changed since Morgenthau wrote these lines at the beginning of the Cold War, but nevertheless he correctly identifies the major roadblock to a world government.

The Europeans have shown that the obstacle of national sovereignty is not in fact insuperable. After World War II, European leaders such as Jean Monnet and his Action Committee for a United States of Europe determined to put an end to the long series of terrible wars on that continent by integrating the nations. They proceeded in a step-by-step fashion, starting with the original 'Six', and proceeding through a series of treaties to build first the European Coal and Steel Community, then the European Economic Community, and finally the present European Union, which now embraces twenty-eight nation-states and nearly 500 million inhabitants. The EU is going through some severe trials and tribulations at the present time, but the great original objective is now secure. There will never again be a war between France and Germany.

Similarly, at the world level, we could start with an association with strictly limited aims linking some of the more progressive nations – e.g. the democracies – and then build from there, progressively expanding functions, developing institutions, and including more members, until a democratic world federation is eventually achieved. We have argued in a companion submission [28] that this is the easiest and most likely route to a global parliament. There is some overlap between the two submissions, necessary to make each of them reasonably self-contained.

The first step would seem to be the formation of a community on the European model, rather than the more ambitious target of a union or federation. Hence we are led to propose a World Community of Democratic Nations (the pithier name Community of Democracies is already taken, unfortunately [2]). I hope that most people in our movement would see the logic in the argument so far.

Now we come to what is likely to be a much more contentious question, namely, what should be the basis or purpose of such a community? Ideally, it should be economic, and have a strong impact on the daily life of the community in order to attract new members, following the European model. But there seems little call at present for a community based on free trade, like the EEC. The world has been pursuing free trade agreements ever since World War II, and the last Doha Round ended in failure. At present, the nations are mostly pursuing bilateral rather than multilateral agreements.

In my opinion, there is a much more obvious need for a community based on common security, a world security community of democracies. The US tried for a time recently to act as 'global policeman' on its own, and has had its fingers severely burnt in most cases. It led interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria which cost huge amounts of money and left chaos behind them, as witness the present maelstrom in the Middle East. It is now widely recognized, I think, that the US needs to work much more closely with its democratic friends and allies. Hence the formation of a security community made up of the democracies would be a natural next step. Such a community would provide a virtually unchallengeable guarantee of security for its members, and could also provide a strong right arm for the United Nations in security and peacekeeping missions in the wider world.

In the following we will discuss a more detailed proposal of this type. It is proposed that NATO and the OECD should be reconstituted as two arms of a new ***World Community of Democratic Nations***:

2. Background

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, NATO lost its original role as bulwark of Western Europe against a possible Soviet attack. Since then it has been slowly developing a new role, remaining as an umbrella organization for the defence of the Atlantic democracies, but now also acting as their "out of area" security and peacekeeping arm, first in Bosnia, then in Afghanistan and Libya. This is entirely consistent with the Community aims outlined above. Members of the EU are still debating whether they should continue to rely on NATO for their collective defence, or establish their own European armed forces.

A number of Eastern European countries have recently joined NATO, which now has 26 members. This puts the old consensus model of decision-making under great strain. At his parting session with the Atlantic Council, General James Jones, the outgoing Supreme Allied Commander-Europe, called for a stronger political structure for NATO [3]: "Sooner or later, NATO will have to address whether you want 350 committees all acting on the rule of consensus," he said. "What's the logic of one or two countries being able to block action by the remaining 24 members? Why not have a system where they can just opt out?"

Later, a group of five very distinguished military men put forward [4] a '*Grand Strategy*' for renewing NATO, echoing General Jones' call. They were all former chiefs of staff in their respective countries (the US, Britain, France, Germany and Holland), headed by General John Shalikashvili of the US. Among many other suggestions, they demanded a shift in NATO decision-making from consensus to majority voting, and the abolition of national caveats in operational matters. This change alone would transform NATO from a mere alliance into a genuine Community.

Along with new members, many countries further afield have become NATO “Partners”, including even Russia itself. It is therefore not a huge step to envision expanding NATO membership to democracies outside the traditional boundaries of Europe and North America. Former Spanish prime minister Aznar advocated just such an expansion [5]. Emphasizing the new threat of Islamist terrorism, he argued that NATO should develop a new dimension of homeland security to counter it, including integration of intelligence information and security services across all the democracies. He thus concluded that stable democracies such as Israel, Japan, and Australia should be invited to join.

Stanley Sloan has argued [6] for an expanded Atlantic Community – and a new Atlantic Community Treaty – to encourage cooperation among all NATO members on non-military aspects of their security. Tiziana Stella [7] summarized the proposals for reform of NATO which were on the table at that time, including

- reform of decision-making procedures;
- enhanced common funding;
- development of a common foreign policy;
- achieving a unified view on the global role of NATO;
- increased cooperation between Atlantic and global institutions.

Many of these changes have also been called for by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (Resolution 337), as well as by former NATO commanders. At the Lisbon Summit in 2010, NATO members adopted [8] a new “*vision for the Alliance for the next decade: able to defend its members against the full range of threats; capable of managing even the most challenging crises; and better able to work with other organisations and nations to promote international stability*“. This goes some way towards at least the latter two of the proposals listed above.

In recent years, NATO has been recalled towards its original purpose by the revanchist behaviour of Russia under Vladimir Putin. Russia was alarmed and suspicious when its former Soviet satellites in the Baltic states and Eastern Europe elected to join NATO after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Russia’s recent annexation of the Crimea, and destabilisation of the eastern Ukraine, has in turn alarmed the Baltic states and the Eastern Europeans, fearing that they may be the next Russian targets. They have called for more concrete support from NATO as insurance against such a possibility, and indeed NATO has responded to these requests. At the Warsaw summit in 2016, NATO members agreed on steps to “*reinforce our collective defence, enhance our capabilities and strengthen our resilience*” [9].

Reinforcing this theme, the former Secretary-General of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, has published a book [10] offering a bold plan for an *Alliance for Democracy*, a “strengthened American and European alliance, joined by like-minded

liberal democracies such as Japan and Australia, to create a military, political, and economic bulwark against the forces of tyranny.”

We now turn briefly to the OECD, which is now 70 years old. It began life as the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), established in 1947 to implement the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Europe after World War II. In 1961 it was reborn as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, with the US and Canada as members along with the Europeans. New entries have since raised the membership to 34 countries. Russia is now negotiating to become a member.

The current mission of the OECD is to promote policies to improve the economic and social well-being of its members and global society as a whole. It provides a forum where members can discuss common problems, and produces statistics, analyses and forecasts of trends in trade and investment, and recommends policies on the basis of these forecasts. Nevertheless, its importance has diminished somewhat since the glory days of the Marshall Plan.

3. Proposal and Objectives

The proposal then consists of the following basic elements:

- Refocus NATO to give it a global mission, first to guarantee the security and freedom of all its members, and then to act as their security and peacekeeping arm in the wider world, under the aegis of the UN.
- Open membership to stable democracies outside North America and Europe, e.g. Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. Eventually membership of the Community should be opened to any stable, democratic nation, subject to suitable criteria laid down by the existing member states. In the long run, it is envisaged that the organization will become universal, as democracy spreads to the rest of the globe;
- An explicit declaration should be made that the new community will only intervene forcibly in external states if authorized to do so by the UN Security Council, in accordance with international law;
- Alter the dysfunctional decision-making system within NATO, preferably at all levels, to a ‘qualified-majority voting with opt-out’ system, as advocated by senior military men [3,4]. To avoid indecision and deadlock, decisions on functional matters within the agreed competence of the organization should be made by some form of qualified-majority voting (perhaps with an opt-out clause) – unlike the consensus which is customarily required in NATO today. A theoretical voting system is known as the Penrose voting system or the ‘Jagiellonian compromise’ [11], which is very similar to the scheme previously in use by the European Union [12]. This would transform the alliance into a ‘*security community*’, which might be named the *World Community of Democratic Nations*.
- Channel funds to foster development in the more backward member states under the principle of “solidarity” established by the European Union. This would promote a feeling of community among the member states, and provide

a strong incentive for new states to join in. This function could perhaps be undertaken by adding in the OECD, which has a very similar membership, as a second arm of the community.

- Restructure the organization with appropriate organs of democratic governance, following the pattern established by the European Union:
 - A North Atlantic Council already exists, representing the member states. Instead of consensus decision-making, it should adopt a ‘qualified majority’ voting system, as above.
 - A NATO Parliamentary Assembly already exists, as the basis for a democratic chamber, but its official recognition is low;
 - A Court needs to be established, to settle differences over the interpretation of the founding treaty, and settle disputes between the member states on the basis of international law. This would form the embryo of an eventual legal system;
 - A bureaucracy in Brussels already exists, headed by the Secretary-General, and the regular budget of NATO is about \$6 billion per annum, which is already larger than the UN core budget.

Much as for NATO and the OECD at present, the aims of the Community would include

- to guarantee the security of each member state against external attack;
- to undertake security and peacekeeping operations for its members, under the aegis of the UN;
- to promote mutual economic development;
- to provide a framework which could be used for coordinated action on other common issues, such as global financial stability or global warming;
- More broadly, to serve the common global and diplomatic interests of its members.

The first three of these goals are in the NATO Treaty, Articles II, IV, and V. The last three are permissible under the Treaty but not mandated. The fourth and fifth have been taken up gradually by NATO since 1991. The last in principle already exists, broadening NATO from a security alliance into a general purpose diplomatic community; it was embraced by NATO in the 1990s.

Such an association would be much more flexible than the UN, able to change and grow through successive treaties, and could indeed form the nucleus for an eventual system of democratic global governance.

4. Advantages

Let us look at the advantages of this scheme from several different points of view.

a. NATO

Advantages of the scheme from the point of view of NATO members include

- It would provide a virtually ironclad guarantee against external attack for its members
- It would enable them to share the responsibility, and pool their resources, in carrying out peacekeeping and security operations
- It would cure the dysfunctional decision-making procedure presently operative within NATO
- It would provide a new legal framework for settling international disputes between members
- It would give NATO and the OECD an extended and hugely important mission for the future

NATO's limitations have never been for want of sufficient goals, but for want sometimes of sufficient instruments and procedures to carry them out. In the 1950s NATO appointed a committee of three 'Wise Men' to develop means of implementing its goals of closer political and economic cooperation. While their report was officially adopted by NATO by consensus, only some portions of it were put into practice. The economic implementation was deliberately left to a separate organization, the OECD. Formed at the beginning of the 1960s as the successor to the implementing structures of the Marshall Plan; the OECD was able to include neutral European democracies, and bring in four Pacific allies: Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea. The Atlantic world thereby took on a dual, split-level identity: the Atlantic-only level and the Atlantic-Pacific level, or 'Atlanticism' and 'Trilateralism'.

b. OECD

After implementation of the Marshall Plan was completed, the OEEC/OECD lost its most important role, and has functioned thereafter primarily as a clearing-house for information and policy advice. By taking charge of structural adjustment funds being channelled to the less developed members of the Community, the OECD would gain a new function of major importance, very similar to its original role under the Marshall Plan.

c. UN

Acting in tandem with the UN, the new Community could bring important advantages

- Acting strictly at the behest of the Security Council, the Community would provide a powerful means of enforcement for the resolutions of the Council. It could play a role very like that originally envisaged for a standing security force

under Article 47 of the UN Charter. It would only intervene in an external state if authorized to do so by the Council; but conversely, like its member states, it would be obliged to lend support to any security enforcement actions which were in fact mandated by the Security Council, under article 43 of the Charter. It would thus provide a strong right arm to back up any security actions of the UN.

- Furthermore, the new Community could quite easily set up rapid reaction units to carry out the role advocated for UNEPS, the proposed UN Emergency Peace Service. It could and should also set up mechanisms to reconstruct failed states after conflict, perhaps a Reconciliation and Reconstruction Commission, following the outstanding example of the Marshall Plan after World War II. This would give NATO a very positive role to play in healing the wounds created by armed conflict, something conspicuously absent after the recent overthrow of regimes in Iraq and Libya. President Obama himself has expressed regret at being unable to put “boots on the ground” to restore order and stable government after the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya [13]. Such developments would be in full accord with the role of the new Peacebuilding Commission at the UN.

Thus the UN and the Community together would make up a greatly strengthened and more effective system of common security and international governance.

d. USA

One of the Republican contenders for the U.S. Presidency in 2008, John McCain, caused quite a stir when he proposed the formation of a ‘*League of Democracies*’ in order to build an enduring peace based on freedom [14]. “We Americans must be willing to listen to the collective will of our democratic allies,” he said. On the Democratic side, Ivo Daalder, formerly the U.S. Permanent Representative on the Council of NATO, together with James Lindsay, proposed a ‘*Concert of Democracies*’ in order to form an “international institution capable of prompt and effective action both to prevent, and where necessary respond to threats to international security” [15].

The idea of a Concert of Democracies was also promoted in an authoritative, bipartisan report from the Princeton Project [16], “*Forging a World of Liberty under Law*” in 2006. So it seems there could be support for such ideas from both sides of politics in the U.S. The Obama administration was anxious to strengthen multilateral institutions and seek more cooperation with America’s friends and allies.

It might be thought that the U.S. Congress would be against voting in NATO as a threat to national sovereignty. However, this has not been the case. When approving the previous round of expansion of NATO membership, Congress adopted a resolution calling for exploration of moving away from consensus in NATO. The resolution was watered down to mere exploration, because the State Department opposed the resolution and felt the consensus system was working well. To be sure,

there would undoubtedly be an opt out provision, so the issue is one of pooling only a small part of sovereignty -- probably less than the other members pool already in the NATO Integrated Command -- yet an important part of it, as it lies in the military and foreign policy sphere. Apparently Americans do not have the same hypersensitivity about loss of sovereignty when it comes to NATO, a grouping of fellow advanced democracies, as when it comes to UN-level institutions.

Even in the later days of the Bush administration there were moves in this direction. "Unilateralism is out, effective multilateralism is in," said David Fried, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs [17]. "The hope is to see NATO as the core of a global security community," according to Victoria Nuland, U.S. Ambassador to NATO at the time [18]. The idea of a 'global NATO' was also advocated in a paper by Daalder and Goldgeier [19] in 2006. Noting its expanded global role, they declared that "NATO's next move must be to open its membership to any democratic state in the world". They argued that NATO "would become a more capable and legitimate adjunct to the UN by helping to implement and enforce its decisions".

Thus the main advantage for the US would be the opportunity to share with its partners the burden and responsibility of acting as 'global policeman', which no single nation has the right to assume in any case. In these times of financial stringency, the cost is a major consideration. In recent years, the astronomical cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, plus an expenditure on armaments roughly equivalent to the rest of the world put together, has taken a heavy toll on the US budget, so that the national debt now stands around 100% of GDP. Action to cut costs needs to be taken urgently, and sharing more of the security burden would help enormously. A move towards shared responsibility and collective security is clearly the right thing to do in any case.

The fact that spokesmen on both sides of US politics have advocated somewhat similar ideas indicates that a scheme of this sort should have a good chance of acceptance in the US, and if the US leads the way, the other members of NATO and the OECD are very likely to follow. The advent of the new Trump administration has thrown all such calculations into doubt, of course, but President Trump has shown himself very keen to get the other members of NATO to shoulder more of the burden, and this scheme should help him to do that.

e. Europe

Europeans have already had long experience with transnational cooperation through the European Union. The Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, is very much in favour of multilateral cooperation, as is the President of France, Francois Hollande. An ex-prime-minister of France, Edouard Balladur, has gone so far as to suggest a full union between the USA and Europe to deal with the full range of global foreign policy issues [20].

Despite this, the Europeans have apparently been very wary of the idea of a 'global NATO', being fearful of being dragged into neo-imperialist adventures under the dominance of the United States. Indeed, Daalder and Goldgeier had argued [21] that "If, as in the case of Kosovo in 1999, the UN is unwilling to authorize action against a threat to international peace and security, NATO might have to act anyway." This could be seen as contravening international law, and for these reasons the League/Concert idea was pronounced "dead in the water" at that time [21].

These fears would be answered by an explicit declaration that the new Community would never use force to intervene in an external state unless authorized to do so by the Security Council, or else if it was itself under external attack. Furthermore, under a qualified majority voting scheme the US would have the largest voice, but by no means a dominant voice, in the councils of the Community. The introduction of qualified majority voting would give the Europeans a full voice in the decisions of the Community.

Very recently, debate has been revived in Europe as to whether a European army should be set up. Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the European Commission, called for the EU to create a "common military force", including a command headquarters in Brussels. "We have to take responsibility for protecting ourselves and the European way of life", he said [22]. Britain has always been firmly opposed to this idea, but now that the Brexit vote has taken place, this impediment has been removed. The Eastern Europeans are also opposed, being more concerned that the Atlantic alliance, i.e. NATO, should reinforce its presence in the East as bulwark against the perceived Russian threat. NATO has indeed agreed to station four battalions in the Baltic states and Eastern Poland [23].

Establishment of the Community would probably settle the long-running debate as to whether Europe should build up its own armed forces for external defence. Europe would be able to rely on the Community for its external defence, and thereby save a considerable amount of money.

f. Sweden

Sweden is an example of a neutral state within Europe, and is not currently a member of NATO. There has been considerable internal debate, however, as to whether Sweden should in fact join NATO, and this has been fuelled recently by the revanchist behaviour of Russia. If NATO were to become a global security community, in conjunction with the UN, that might very well tip the balance and persuade Sweden to join the new organisation.

g. Russia and China

During the Cold War, the USSR looked on NATO with fear and suspicion, regarding it as a tool of the Western democracies and a threat to their very existence. Russia evidently continues to hold that viewpoint today. But if the new Community could only intervene militarily when authorized by the Security Council to do so, then Russia

would effectively have a veto over Community operations in the outside world. This should allay any Russian fears, especially when combined with the promise that they could eventually earn entry into the Community themselves. The only remaining areas of contention would be the former satellites such as Ukraine, regarded by Russia as within their 'sphere of influence'. We can only hope that these issues can eventually be settled by peaceful means.

Similar remarks would apply to China, albeit to a lesser extent

h. Australia

Australia provides an example of a nation which might become a new member of such a global community. Australia's security is already guaranteed, effectively, by the ANZUS alliance with the US. Australian military leaders tend to recoil with horror at the suggestion that Australia should join NATO, presumably because of the dysfunctional decision-making system there. This would hopefully be cured by a qualified majority voting system.

Australia is already a NATO Partner in any case, and has contributed the largest non-NATO contingent of troops in Afghanistan. Full membership in the Community would give Australia a voice at the 'top table', and allow it to play a significant part in the emerging system of democratic international governance.

As with the Europeans, there are fears within Australia of being dragged into neo-imperialist adventures at the chariot wheels of the US. This is exemplified by the recent book *'Dangerous Allies'* from ex-prime minister Malcolm Fraser, which calls for Australia to pull back from the US alliance and take a more independent stance [24]. Adherence to the new Community would solve this problem, and allow Australia to participate in a more constructive and forward-looking system of collective security.

5. Possible Problems

a. Polarization of the international community

Non-member states of the new Community may feel excluded, and suspicious of the motives behind it. If the Community interfered in their affairs, they would feel resentful, and would tend to regard the Community as an "enemy", creating a split between "us" and "them". Such a polarization of the international community should be avoided at all costs.

Thus it would be important to make overtures to non-members, as the far-seeing Harmel Report recommended for NATO many years ago. It should be emphasized that membership of the Community is open to all countries, provided only that they satisfy suitable criteria for democratic governance and peaceful relations with their neighbours.

Furthermore, the Community should guarantee never to undertake a military intervention in a non-member country, unless authorized to do so by the Security Council of the UN. This might be a somewhat contentious issue in some quarters in the US, for instance, because it would place restrictions on the role the Community could play in serving US interests. It would even give Russia and China a veto over the external interventions of the Community. But in fact such a policy is obligatory under international law, as laid down in the UN Charter (Articles 2 & 42). It would also allay fears in Russia and China that the new Community was aimed against them.

Finally, significant economic inducements should be offered to new members to join the Community. The European Union has shown the way to achieve this. Substantial amounts of 'structural adjustment' funds should be channelled through the OECD arm of the Community towards the less developed member states, to bring their standard of living up to par with other members under the principle of '*solidarity*'. The non-member states would be motivated to join in order to access these funds.

b. Conflict with the role of the UN

A related problem is that the Community might be seen as competing with the role of the UN, in that both would be global security organizations. It will be vitally important to demonstrate that the Community would function in a manner complementary to the UN, rather than competing with it. Again, the Community should only intervene in a non-member state at the behest of the Security Council. The forces at the Community's disposal would then provide powerful reinforcement to the decisions of the Security Council. In fact, they would effectively supply the place of the standing armed forces originally envisaged for the UN under Article 47 of the Charter.

Furthermore, it would be no great step for the new Community to set up rapid reaction units to fill the role suggested for UNEPS, the United Nations Emergency Peace Service, which has been advocated by numerous NGOs for some time. The Community could quite easily fill this role in an effective manner. It might also set up a Reconstruction and Reconciliation Commission to help restore stable governance to failed states following a UN intervention.

In summary, far from conflicting with the role of the UN, the new Community would fit in very neatly as the Security Council's strong right arm.

c. Forcing 'Western' values on other cultures

It might be charged that requiring democracy of new members is tantamount to forcing Western ideas of government onto what is meant to be a global community. But that is not a sustainable argument. Government "of the people, by the people, for the people" is a universal concept, not a purely Western one, and the thriving democracies

in Japan and India are convincing examples of this. As more non-Western members join the Community, these fears should quickly be allayed.

6. Conclusions

In summary, the new Community would bring many benefits. It would cure some of the major problems within the present NATO system. It would produce a powerful new global security community, which acting in tandem with the Security Council would be a strong force for peace and freedom in the world.

Spokesmen on both sides of politics in the US have put forward similar schemes, so there is a good chance that a plan of this sort would be acceptable to the USA. The Europeans would most likely be happy to follow, and so the proposal should have a good chance of being implemented.

If the Community is open to new members, subject to suitable criteria of democracy and peaceful relations with their neighbours, then one can envisage many new members joining up, attracted by the prospect of new structural adjustment funds coming their way. The membership could soon include the majority of the world's nations, as more countries become democratic. Eventually, one may hope that membership in the Community would become universal. About two new countries became 'fully free' every year for the thirty years up until 2005, according to Freedom House [25].

With the addition of a Court, and the adoption of qualified majority voting, the association would become a community on the European model. It would provide a convenient forum for discussion and the making of common policy on matters beyond the security sphere, including trade, finance and the environment. In time to come, one can envisage the Community evolving into a full-blown system of democratic global governance.

What are we doing at the World Citizens Association of Australia to promote these ideas? We have formed a Coalition for a World Community of Democratic Nations [26], copying the successful strategy of WFM-IGP. I moved a resolution at the Council meeting of WFM-IGP in 2015 that the World Federalist Movement should officially support the Coalition, but the resolution was narrowly lost on a vote of 16-18. It remains something of a shell organisation at present, consisting of little more than a website. The coalition would benefit enormously from any participation by the GCF.

Recommendation 1. We recommend that the GCF should join, and support, the Coalition for a World Community of Democratic Nations.

Given resources, we would like to organise a high-level international conference, or series of conferences, to discuss ideas of this sort. Hopefully it could be done in collaboration with other influential organisations such as the Brookings Institution,

the Centre for International Governance Innovation in Canada, or the Atlantic Council. If the GCF was willing to provide support, we could probably get this idea off the ground.

Recommendation 2. We recommend that the GCF should support a high-level international conference on the idea of a world community of democratic nations.

These recommendations have already appeared in the companion submission [28].

Compliance with Criteria

We are presenting here a scheme for the first step along the ‘Uniting the democracies’ path, which is one of the recognized possible routes to a global parliament. We believe this is the easiest and best route.

This scheme does not fully satisfy all the guidelines for the Global Challenges Prize, but we believe that it follows a realistic analysis of the problem, and we ask for it to receive serious consideration. We have not specified the exact structure of a global parliament, but something along the lines of the European Union would certainly be capable of effectively addressing the global problems and risks to humanity.

Can it be implemented within the foreseeable future? The first step that we have outlined could be implemented almost immediately. We do not believe the final goal can be reached overnight, unfortunately, but one would hope that it could be attained via an evolutionary path over several decades.

The guidelines state that “models that postulate that all states should be democratic” must be eliminated. Here we disagree. We have discussed the basic principles that must underlie a global parliament [27], and democracy must be one of them. Some of the GCF’s own criteria become highly problematic in a non-democratic system. As mentioned before, democracy is the only form of government with a safety-valve, whereby the people can replace the government if it is doing a bad job.

Does that mean we have to wait until all states become democracies before we reach the final goal? Probably yes. At least we must wait for Russia and China to become fully democratic before we can have a fully-functioning global parliament. This might hopefully occur within fifty years. We could start the journey right away, however, with a smaller group of existing democracies, and co-operation measures with non-democracies could surely be found along the way.

In the companion submission [27], we have listed a number of principles which should underpin any future global parliament, and also any intermediate steps towards that goal, such as the World Community of Democratic Nations which we have discussed here. Those principles are mentioned in the Maastricht Treaty, and included among them are the rule of law, human rights, democracy, solidarity, subsidiarity. A global parliament should also be universal, but that obviously would not apply to this first intermediate stage.

Bearing in mind those principles which we have just mentioned, it can readily be seen that a global parliament would satisfy all the given criteria. The Community we have been discussing as a first step would not satisfy all of them, clearly, but would be a huge step in that direction.

Core Values. Under the principle of solidarity, the welfare and rights of all citizens would be respected equally.

Decision-making Capacity. Under the rule of law, the Community would have the power to make binding laws and regulations within its defined sphere of responsibility.

Effectiveness. The security community which we have been discussing would only be effective in dealing with a few of the global challenges confronting us. Over time, as it expands, it would hopefully be able to put an end to the ancient and primitive plague of warfare that has afflicted our planet. It would eventually be able to control and then eliminate the stockpiles of nuclear weapons that threaten our very existence. It would not initially tackle the other global challenges listed, but it would provide a very convenient framework for its members to cooperate with each other, and would be able to evolve in the future to tackle those challenges as well.

Resources and Financing. We have not attempted to specify how financing might be arranged. To begin with, it would presumably rely on member contributions as NATO does at present. Once again, the European Union provides a possible model to follow later.

Trust and Insight. Here the principles of solidarity, subsidiarity and democracy would be important, to ensure that all citizens are treated equally under the law, and the people are involved as far as possible in making decisions, with guaranteed insight into the operations of the community. Here is one area where democracy is crucial.

Flexibility. The evolutionary path followed by Europe is very flexible, involving continuous reviews and alterations by means of treaties. The path of uniting the democracies by stages would allow similar flexibility.

Protection against the Abuse of Power. Here is another area where the principle of democracy is crucial. Under a democratic system, the people have the means of remedying any abuse of power. This is a principle that our forefathers have fought and died for in the past.

Accountability. Again, democracy is a crucial element here. Democratic systems may be crude and inefficient, but they allow the people, or their representatives, to demand accountability from the governing administration.

Human Rights. This is not listed in the guidelines, but it should be an important criterion as well. This is one more reason why democracy is important, to make sure

human rights are respected and observed. Some autocratic regimes apparently do not acknowledge any concept of individual human rights at all.

The security community discussed here would be a first step toward a global parliament which would satisfy all the required criteria, and represent a huge step forwards in global governance, allowing us to tackle those looming global challenges in a much more effective way than we can do at present. It would open an era of new hope for humankind.

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